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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium using EU-SILC micro data. We contribute to the literature in distinguishing 
homeowners with mortgage payments and outright homeowners. We simultaneously 
estimate unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, and the probability 
of being an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments or a tenant by a 
mixed multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal influence of 
different types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use instrumental variables. 
Our results show that homeowners with a mortgage exit unemployment first. Outright 
owners stay unemployed the longest. Tenants take an intermediate position. Moreover, our 
results reveal the different share of mortgage holders within the group of homeowners as a 
possible explanation for the discrepancy between former contributions to this literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Does homeownership impair an individual’s labour market outcome? Seminal work by A.J. 
Oswald (1996, 1997) suggests that it does. A key element in his view is that high costs of 
buying and selling homes make homeowners less geographically mobile than tenants. As a 
result, in case of job loss, the number of suitable vacancies within homeowners’ reach will 
be much smaller. Their exit rate from unemployment will therefore be lower. Empirically, 
many studies confirm Oswald’s claim that homeowners are geographically less mobile than 
tenants (see, e.g., Hughes and McCormick, 1981, 1987; Böheim and Taylor, 2002; Caldera 
Sánchez and Andrews, 2011; Isebaert, 2013). Nevertheless, direct research into the 
relationship between housing tenure choice and labour market outcomes using micro data 
does generally not find that homeowners have worse labour market perspectives than 
tenants. Battu et al. (2008) for example find no significant difference in the speed of 
transition from unemployment into employment among homeowners versus private tenants 
in the UK. Munch et al. (2006) even observe a faster exit from unemployment into 
employment among owners than among tenants in a large panel of Danish individuals, while 
van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find a significant negative impact of homeownership on 
the risk of becoming unemployed in the Netherlands. These three papers are important not 
only for their results, but also methodologically. Each of them adequately deals with the 
impact of individuals’ unobserved characteristics which may affect both their labour market 
situation and their tenure choice. 
From a theoretical point of view, various explanations have been advanced in these 
and other micro studies to rationalize the better perspectives of owners on the labour 
market. Coulson and Fisher (2002) emphasize the importance of social networks in the 
search for work. Homeowners tend to invest more in their social network which improves 
their local job opportunities. Munch et al. (2006) add that because of high moving costs, 
homeowners have a lower reservation wage and a higher search intensity for local jobs. 
According to van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2008) homeowners are 
willing to invest more in their job, in order to maximize the probability of staying in the local 
job. Accordingly, firms anticipate longer employment duration of homeowners and so are 
willing to invest in firm-specific training. This further increases firm-specific productivity of 
the homeowner. 
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This paper investigates the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium, using EU-SILC micro data. Our basic research question is therefore the same as that 
of Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). We also follow these studies in their choice of 
methodology. Our main contribution to the literature is that we distinguish different types of 
homeowners. Whereas Munch et al. (2006) only make the broad subdivision between 
homeowners and non-homeowners, and Battu et al. (2008) split up the second group into 
public and private tenants, we distinguish homeowners with mortgage payments and 
outright owners. For Belgium, where the rate of homeownership is close to 70%, this is 
clearly the most relevant distinction. About two thirds of all homeowners are mortgagees, 
about one third are outright owners1. From the point of view of the Oswald hypothesis, 
different labour market outcomes between both groups of owners should not be expected. 
The search and transaction costs that are associated with moving are similar for outright 
owners and mortgagees2. The motivation for not treating homeowners as a homogeneous 
group lies elsewhere. Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010) embed the distinction between both 
types of owner-occupiers in a theoretical framework explaining search behaviour. Building 
on Munch et al. (2006), they develop a model with both local and non-local labour markets. 
Moving costs both decrease owners’ nonlocal job search (the Oswald effect) and increase 
their local search. The net effect of moving costs in Rouwendal and Nijkamp is that owners 
on average experience longer unemployment duration. They further advance this theoretical 
model by introducing housing costs. The fraction of the wage that is not spent on housing 
goes to nondurable consumption which determines utility. Decreasing marginal utility 
explains why the unemployed will have a higher search intensity when housing costs are 
high. This result may critically affect the earlier theoretical outcome. According to 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp’s model, if housing costs are lower for homeowners than for 
tenants (as is the case for outright homeowners), owners will experience even longer 
                                                          
1
 Private rental and social housing account for about 23% and 7% of housing supply respectively. In the UK that 
is 15.6% and 18% (Pittini and Laino, 2011).  
2
 Unsurprisingly, the above mentioned empirical literature studying geographical mobility leaves us with mostly 
ambiguous answers to the question whether outright owners or mortgagees are more geographically mobile. 
For example, in a cross-section of 23 OECD countries, Caldera Sánchez and Andrews (2011) find outright 
owners to be less residentially mobile than owners with mortgage payments in 15 countries. They observe the 
opposite in 4 other countries. In 4 last countries, one of which is Belgium, there is no significant difference 
between outright owners and mortgagees. Isebaert (2013) by contrast uses panel data and finds mortgagees to 
be less geographically mobile than outright owners in Belgium. The only robust empirical result across studies 
seems to be that tenants are more residentially mobile than owners. 
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unemployment duration. The Oswald effect is then reinforced by a (low) housing cost effect. 
If housing costs for owners are higher than for tenants (as may be the case for mortgagees), 
the reverse occurs. The unemployed owners’ search intensity will then rise, and their 
unemployment duration falls. The Oswald effect may then be beaten by a (high) housing 
cost effect. Building on this theory, one may therefore expect the fastest exit from 
unemployment for mortgagees, and the slowest for outright owners. Tenants may take an 
intermediate position3. 
Empirically, to the best of our knowledge, only Goss and Phillips (1997) and Flatau et al. 
(2003) made the distinction between outright owners and owners with a mortgage to 
address differences in unemployment duration before. Both papers find higher exit rates 
from unemployment for homeowners with a mortgage. Methodologically, however, the 
empirical models used in these studies do not adequately handle the potential endogeneity 
bias that may arise if a person’s unobserved characteristics affect both his unemployment 
duration and housing tenure. Munch et al. (2006) provide the example of a person who is 
inherently less mobile because of preference for stability. On the one hand, this person will 
be inclined to buy a house and settle in a chosen area. On the other hand, the stability-
preferring individual is less willing to move for job reasons, extending the duration of an 
unemployment spell. One might falsely interpret the combination of these events as a causal 
relationship from homeownership to longer unemployment. To resolve this issue, we adopt 
an econometric framework that builds on those used by van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004), 
Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). More precisely, we simultaneously estimate 
unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, and the probability of being 
an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments or a tenant by a mixed 
multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal influence of different 
types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use instrumental variables 
(exclusion restrictions). These are variables that influence housing tenure but do not directly 
                                                          
3
 Available data for Belgium support the idea that housing costs differ significantly by tenure situation. 
Vastmans and Buyst (2011) reveal that monthly mortgage payments account for 24.6% of a household’s net 
monthly income, on average. Housing costs of outright owners by contrast are limited to the maintenance 
costs. As to the distinction between homeowners with a mortgage and tenants, Heylen et al. (2007) report a 
mean rental price in the Flemish region in 2005 of 396€, while the mean mortgage payment was equal to 564€. 
The latter clearly represents the heaviest burden on the household budget. Furthermore, tenants experience 
lower costs of maintenance since the depreciation of a dwelling is to a great extent at the expense of the 
owner. 
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affect unemployment duration. Finding good instruments is often a delicate task in this 
literature. We contribute by adding a new instrument, which is the relative price of buying to 
renting a house at the moment in the past that people signed the contract underlying their 
current tenure.  
This paper is the first to analyse the research question at stake for Belgium. For several 
reasons Belgium may be a very interesting case to test the link between housing and labour 
market situation at the micro level. The rate of homeownership is considerably higher than 
in the countries analysed in the aforementioned studies (van Ewijk and van Leuvensteijn, 
2009). Furthermore, Belgian tax rates on housing transactions are among the highest in the 
world (European Mortgage Federation, 2010). Also Belgian labour market characteristics 
differ strongly from those in the previously investigated countries. To mention one, 
unemployment benefit duration is much longer (OECD, 2013). Taking into account all these 
considerations, if there were one country to expect a strong Oswald effect, it would be 
Belgium. Recent macroeconomic work also confirms this. Using aggregate data of Belgian 
districts since 1970, Isebaert et al. (2013) find strong empirical evidence in favour of the 
Oswald hypothesis. 
In accordance with the aforementioned theoretical expectations in the spirit of 
Rouwendal and Nijkamp (2010), our empirical results prove that homeowners are not a 
homogeneous group. The result found by Munch et al. (2006) that homeowners have 
shorter unemployment spells than tenants, only applies to homeowners with a mortgage. 
Outright owners by contrast remain unemployed the longest. Not having to pay rent or to 
repay a mortgage seemingly decreases the search intensity of an individual. This result 
survives various robustness checks. For example, it does not depend on the specific 
exclusion restrictions that we impose on the model. Neither is it conditional on the age of 
the individuals in our sample: it also holds if we restrict the sample to owners younger than 
50.  
Our results may transcend the single Belgian case. A possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the results of Munch et al. (2006) for Denmark and Battu et al. (2008) 
for the UK is the different share of mortgage holders within the group of homeowners. In 
Denmark the fraction of mortgagees is about 73%. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
positive effect for this subgroup dominates the negative effect for outright owners, when no 
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distinction is made between both groups. In the UK the fraction of mortgagees in the group 
of owners is (only) about 56%. Positive and negative effects on the exit rate from 
unemployment from both subgroups may then cancel out.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we provide the reader with an 
introduction to the dataset and some descriptive analyses. The specification of our 
methodological framework is included in Section 3. In Section 4 we show the results of our 
estimations. A final section concludes. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
To analyse unemployment spells in Belgium, we use the recent dataset of the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). This survey provides longitudinal 
data of topics such as labour market conditions, education, housing tenure, income and 
social exclusion. It was designed in order to replace the less harmonized European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). By using the EU-SILC data, we are able to analyse 
household behaviour in the period 2003-2008. A prominent characteristic of this survey is 
the rotating sample design. The first quarter of the sample is replaced each year. Hence, the 
sample of households is fully renewed after four years. 
We use the spells of unemployment that start after a period of employment (i.e. left-
censored spells are withheld). A spell can end with re-employment or with right-censoring. 
The latter can be the result of an activity status different from (un)employment4, or can be 
due to non-observation in the next period. Consequently, unemployment spells that 
outreach the period of observation, are automatically right-censored. Only the first 
unemployment spell of each individual is included. During the 6 year time interval, we 
observe 1048 unemployment spells of which 26 are dropped from the sample because of 
missing values for one or more of the explanatory variables. Yet another 9 spells are filtered 
out for the individuals indicating they enjoy “free housing accommodation”. From the 
remaining 1013 unemployment spells, 557 spells are fully recorded and 456 spells are right-
censored. 
                                                          
4
 Possible destinations are retirement, being permanently disabled or taking up domestic tasks and care 
responsibilities. 
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In the EU-SILC dataset, the labour market status is observed monthly. For 
comparison, it is measured with a weekly frequency in the Danish dataset of Munch et al. 
(2006). Labour market observations in the BHPS used by Battu et al. (2008) are also monthly. 
Figure 1 reports non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the monthly transition out of 
unemployment by housing status at the start of the unemployment spell in our dataset. 
Panel A illustrates that owners and tenants show similar transition patterns when we merge 
outright owners and owners with mortgage payments into one group. By contrast, when we 
distinguish the latter two categories of owners, as presented in Panel B, we find clear 
differences between the three housing options. Outright owners have, on average, the 
longest unemployment spells (with a median duration of 33 months). Tenants and 
mortgagees have shorter spells with a median duration of 8 respectively 5 months. However, 
since this comparison does not take selection on neither observable nor unobservable 
characteristics into account, we cannot conclude from this descriptive evidence that the 
transition out of unemployment happens slower for outright owners. These particular 
individuals might have very low chances to leave unemployment fast because of other 
factors that are dominant within the group of outright owners. The econometric method 
that we apply in this paper takes the selection on (un)observable characteristics into account 
and leads therefore to a better founded answer to our research question. 
The mean and standard deviation of the explanatory variables used in our analysis 
are listed in Table 1. As a matter of illustration, these two statistics are shown for each 
housing status separately as well. For all the explanatory variables in both the 
unemployment duration model and the housing status model, we use their value at the start 
of the unemployment spell, and then keep it constant. If these variables were not kept 
constant, the assumption of strict exogeneity would be violated due to the possibility of 
reverse causality (see the next section for a more extensive elaboration on this).5 EU-SILC 
measures the status of all these explanatory variables with a yearly frequency, at the start of 
each calendar year (around March). Also the housing status is measured with a yearly 
frequency. Given our monthly observations of the labour market status, we interpolate in 
 
                                                          
5
 The only explanatory variable that we allow to vary during unemployment spells is the regional 
unemployment rate. This variable is strictly exogenous all the way. It contributes to the model by capturing the 
business cycle at the regional level. Belgium consists of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels). 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates – unemployment duration by housing status 
A. Owners versus tenants 
 
B. Mortgagees versus outright owners versus tenants 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Overall Tenants Outright owners Mortgagees 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Housing tenure categories 
Tenant 0.35 (0.48)       
Outright owner 0.23 (0.42)             
Mortgagee 0.42 (0.49)             
Explanatory variables used in both unemployment duration and housing equations 
Woman 0.57 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.62 (0.48) 
Foreign nationality 0.15 (0.36) 0.23 (0.42) 0.07 (0.25) 0.14 (0.35) 
Age 16-24 years 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.35) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 
Age 25-34 years 0.31 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.15 (0.36) 0.36 (0.48) 
Age 35-49 years 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.18 (0.38) 0.41 (0.49) 
Age ≥ 50 years 0.27 (0.44) 0.16 (0.37) 0.61 (0.49) 0.17 (0.37) 
Low educated 0.27 (0.44) 0.32 (0.47) 0.28 (0.45) 0.22 (0.42) 
Middle educated 0.40 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 
High educated 0.33 (0.47) 0.26 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49) 
Cohabiting partner 0.66 (0.47) 0.51 (0.50) 0.65 (0.48) 0.80 (0.40) 
Working partner 0.42 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) 
Having children younger than 18 0.52 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45) 
Densely populated area 0.54 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47) 0.49 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 
Brussels 0.12 (0.33) 0.19 (0.40) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 
Flanders 0.53 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 
Wallonia 0.34 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49) 
Unemployment rate (province) 0.12 (0.06) 0.13 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 
Unemployment rate (region) 0.11 (0.06) 0.12 (0.06) 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 
Explanatory variables used only in housing equations 
% homeowners (province) 0.67 (0.10) 0.65 (0.12) 0.68 (0.09) 0.68 (0.09) 
House price to rent ratio in year of 
contract (province) 
1.47 (0.63) 1.79 (0.78) 1.20 (0.43) 1.36 (0.45) 
Source: own calculations based on EU-SILC data, except for unemployment rate (VDAB, FOREM, Belgostat, Vlaamse 
Arbeidsrekening), homeownership rate (Social-Economic Survey 2011) and house price to rent ratio. (FOD 
Economie, Belgian Federal Government) 
A more detailed definition of each variable is given in appendix A.1. 
the spirit of van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) and Battu et al. (2008) the yearly 
observations for the explanatory variables into monthly observations. We assume that the 
monthly values from October of year y-1 until September of year y equal the observed yearly 
value in year y.6 This may unavoidably cause some measurement errors. Housing status may 
in some cases be misperceived. As an example, it might be possible that an individual 
                                                          
6
 The interpolation that we impose assigns the yearly observation in EU-SILC s to six months before and six 
months after the moment of measurement (around March). This also brings the advantage of a larger sample. 
When new households enter the panel in year y, data is collected also about their labour market situation in 
the twelve months of y-1. Spells that start in October of y-1 can therefore also be included in our sample. 
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becomes unemployed in October of year y-1 and changes tenure in December of that year. 
In that case our interpolation would imply a wrong value for the housing status variable 
related to this unemployment spell. Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) also recognize this 
possibility of measurement error, but state that there are no strong a priori beliefs that 
these errors lead to an important bias in the estimation results. Considering the results of a 
sensitivity analysis that we did, we agree. More precisely, we imposed for the yearly 
observed explanatory variables an alternative interpolation, namely that the monthly values 
from January until December of year y equal the observed yearly value of year y. Estimating 
our model for exactly the same sample (including the maximum number of unemployment 
spells that can be included under both types of interpolation), our results are very similar. 
Estimated values for the key coefficients in our model differ by much less than one standard 
error (details are available upon request). 
Table 1 shows that, concerning the housing status, mortgagees constitute the largest 
fraction in our dataset, followed by tenants. When inspecting the explanatory variables used 
in both unemployment duration and housing equations by housing status at the start of the 
unemployment spell, we see that the subsample of outright owners contains relatively more 
individuals (61%) who are older than 50. As re-employment chances for the elderly are 
relatively low in Belgium (OECD, 2012), this immediately provides one example of a factor 
that could have biased the descriptive evidence in Figure 1. When further comparing 
outright owners and mortgagees, it can be observed that the latter group comprises 
relatively more female, foreign, high-educated and cohabiting individuals. In addition, 
compared to both groups of owners, more tenants have a foreign background, are low-
educated, are single and are living in a densely populated area. 
The lower part of Table 1 shows the two variables that serve as instruments in order 
to control for the endogeneity of housing tenure. First, we follow van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning (2004) and Munch et al. (2006, 2008) and introduce the percentage of homeowners 
in the province into our model. This fraction ought to have a positive effect on the 
probability of becoming a homeowner. The validity of this instrument is discussed 
thoroughly by van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004). Note, however, that Coulson and Fisher 
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(2009) challenge this validity7. We will therefore also conduct a sensitivity analysis without 
this instrument. We iterate this exercise for the other instrument as well. As our second 
instrument, we use the ratio of the market price of houses to the rental price at the level of 
the province, and in the year of signing the rental contract for tenants or the year of 
purchase for homeowners. When buying a house is relatively inexpensive in comparison to 
renting, the probability of becoming a homeowner instead of a tenant will increase. 
Furthermore, this instrument contributes to explaining the probability of being an outright 
owner versus a mortgage holder. When house prices are relatively high, households will be 
compelled to borrow larger amounts. One can expect this to imply longer repayment 
periods, reducing the probability that individuals will be outright owners. Since this price 
ratio is computed at the aggregate provincial level and concerns the past, the assumption of 
exogeneity is respected. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model 
In order to investigate the effect of housing status on the duration of unemployment, we 
adopt an econometric framework that builds on those presented by van Leuvensteijn and 
Koning (2004), Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008). On the one hand, the part of the 
model that describes the transition into employment is specified as a mixed proportional 
hazard model. On the other hand, given the potential endogeneity of the housing status, for 
which the former contributions have given evidence, we simultaneously model the 
probability of being an outright homeowner, a mortgagee or a tenant as captured by a 
mixed multinomial logit model. We allow that the unobserved heterogeneity captured in 
both models is mutually correlated. 
Our model differs from the models of the aforementioned studies in three main 
aspects. First, in order to disentangle the effect of being a homeowner with or without 
mortgage payments, we model the housing status as a multinomial logit model instead of a 
                                                          
7
 Coulson and Fisher emphasize external effects. Regional homeownership rates may affect wage setting and 
other costs of doing business in a region. This may affect individuals’ chances on the labour market. The use of 
regional homeownership rates as exclusion restriction would then be invalid. 
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binary logit model. Battu et al. (2008) used the same practice to disentangle the diverging 
influence of social renting and private market renting. Second, like for all explanatory 
variables, we model the housing status only at the start of the unemployment spell and use 
only this (time-constant) status to explain unemployment duration. Our procedure is in 
contrast with the former contributions which model the housing status for each month of 
the unemployment spell and include this time-varying housing status variable in the 
unemployment duration model. We believe, however, that the latter approach may lead to 
an endogeneity bias as a change in housing status during the unemployment spell might be 
caused by the unemployment duration. Third, since in our data we do not measure time 
continuously but on a monthly basis, we take this time-grouping explicitly into account in the 
specification of the model and - ipso facto - of the likelihood function. The alternative option 
is to estimate a pure continuous time model on these time-grouped data as if the data were 
continuous. Although adopted by most of the aforementioned studies, this approximation 
may lead to substantial estimation biases. Gaure et al. (2007, p.1178) argue, based on their 
extensive Monte Carlo assessment of the Timing of Events approach, that this is due to the 
approximation’s inherent failure in locating the appropriate unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution. 
3.1.1. Unemployment duration model 
In our unemployment duration model, the time interval Δt is normalized to one month. The 
hazard rate8 into employment is specified as follows9: 
           , , , exp1 1 12 2 2t z z v t z z vx x'β , (1) 
where t is the elapsed duration since the individual became unemployed. x is the vector of 
observed individual characteristics introduced in the previous section and v is a component 
capturing unobserved heterogeneity. The baseline hazard λ(t), representing the duration 
dependence in the hazard rate, is specified as a piecewise constant non-parametric function. 
Last - and most important - the dummy variables z1 and z2 capture whether the individual is 
a tenant respectively a homeowner without mortgage payments at the start of the 
                                                          
8
 The hazard rate is defined as the probability to flow into employment at date t conditional on being 
unemployed up to t. See Kiefer (1988) for an introduction into duration analysis. 
9
 To avoid cumbersome notation, we ignore that the regional unemployment rate is a time-varying covariate. 
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unemployment spell (being a homeowner with mortgage payments is the reference 
category). These variables indicate the causal effect of a particular housing status at the start 
of the unemployment spell on the transition rate out of unemployment afterwards. 
3.1.2. Housing status model 
The probability of each housing status type at the start of the unemployment spell is 
specified by a multinomial logit model with unobserved effects: 
 
 
   

 
   
exp
Pr , ,1 2
1 exp exp1 2
uh
y h u u
u u
x'αh
x
x'α x'α1 2
 (2) 
in which h = {1,2} and y = 3 – 2z1 – z2. Furthermore, u1 and u2 represent the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the housing status model. The probability of the reference housing status, 
i.e. homeowner with mortgage payments, is then given by: 
      1 Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , ,1 12 2y u u y u ux x . (3) 
x~  is a vector containing x supplemented with the set of additional variables only affecting 
the housing status on which we elaborated in the previous section. This exclusion restriction 
is an important issue with respect to the econometric identification of the housing status 
effect.10 Therefore, as a sensitivity analysis we will re-estimate the model for subsets of the 
instruments. 
3.2. Estimation 
3.2.1. Likelihood conditional on unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
The coefficients of the presented model are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. 
We assume that all sources of correlation between the unemployment duration and the 
housing tenure processes - beyond those captured by the observed explanatory variables - 
can be represented by the (time-invariant and individual-specific) unobserved heterogeneity 
terms. We first derive the likelihood contributions of these two processes conditional on the 
unobserved components u1, u2 and v. 
                                                          
10
 The alternative identification strategy is to exploit the multiple spell feature of the data which is, however, 
not an option given that we observe only few unemployment spells during which the individual’s housing 
status mutates. 
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As to unemployment duration, we assume that the censoring times are stochastically 
independent of the corresponding length of the unemployment spells and the explanatory 
variables. The conditional likelihood of T, which is the unemployment duration as observed 
in the dataset, of a particular individual can be described as11:  
         


      
  
      
            
(1 ) ( )1
x, , , exp exp exp1 2 1 1 1
c cT T T
f T z z v t t tT t t t
. (4) 
This equation expresses the probability of leaving unemployment between T-1 and T (first 
factor of the RHS) if T is not censored, i.e. if c is 0. If T is censored, i.e. if c is 1, the likelihood 
of T equals the survival probability. 
The individual likelihood of y, the housing status at the start of the unemployment 
spell of an individual, is given by: 
 
       

 
      
 
Pr y , ,1 2
(1 )1 21 2Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , , 1 Pr 1 , , Pr 2 , ,1 1 1 12 2 2 2
u u
z zz z
y u u y u u y u u y u u
x
x x x x
 (5)
 
3.2.2. Integrated likelihood 
To obtain the unconditional likelihood contributions, we integrate the conditional 
contributions over the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In this respect, we adopt a 
non-parametric discrete distribution by analogy with Heckman and Singer (1984).12 We 
estimate, in the spirit of van den Berg et al. (2002), our model for an optimal number K - 
optimal according to reliable information criteria - of heterogeneity types in the population 
under investigation. Their proportions are specified as logistic transforms: 



exp( )
exp( )
1
qkpk K
q jj      , with k = [1,K] and qk parameters to estimate (q1 normalized to 0). (6) 
                                                          
11
 To avoid cumbersome notation, we simplified the notation for theta. 
12
 The methodology as advocated by these authors boils down to the assumption that a sample consists of a 
finite number of subsamples with different levels of time-invariant unobservable effects. Then, for all 
subsamples the corresponding proportions are estimated as well as the impact of the unobserved differences 
on the outcomes. 
, with k = [1,K] and qk parameters to be estimated 
   (q1 normalized to 0). (6) 
15 
 
Besides the estimation of these proportions, this approach induces the estimation of one 
mass point (location) for u1, u2 and v for each heterogeneity type: u1k, u2k resp. vk (u11, u21 
resp. v1 are normalized to 0)
13.14 Hence, the likelihood for an agent i is: 
     

x, , , Pr y , ,1 12 21
K
l p f T z z v u uTi kk
x . (7) 
We can then write the unconditional log-likelihood as the sum of the unconditional 
individual log-likelihood contributions: 
 
1
N
L lii
. (8) 
4. Results 
4.1. Basic results 
Table 2 shows our main estimation results of the model. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) indicates an optimal number of two heterogeneity types (K=2)15. Homeowners with 
mortgage payments (who are the reference group) have ceteris paribus the shortest 
unemployment spells. Outright owners, by contrast, stay unemployed the longest. Their 
monthly probability to be re-employed is 39% lower than the re-employment probability of 
owners with mortgage payments16. Our results are consistent with the intuition that having 
to make a monthly payment increases the incentive of finding a job. Tenants have a 21% 
lower probability to exit from unemployment each month compared to mortgagees.   
                                                          
13
 We impose this normalisation since we allow for a constant term in the vector of observed characteristics x. 
14
 We take both the locations and the probabilities of the mass points to be unknown parameters without 
constraining the correlation between u1, u2, and v. Allowing only perfect correlation or no correlation or a priori 
limiting the number of heterogeneity types to an arbitrary number – the latter constraint is adopted in most of 
the mentioned former contributions – may lead to biased estimates, as shown by Gaure et al. (2007). The 
estimation procedure for gathering the probabilities and locations of the mass points is implemented according 
to the latter authors. 
15
 Table A.2 in the Appendix reveals that the alternative information criteria (Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion) indicate an optimal number of only 1 type (K=1). Following the 
argument in Gaure et al. (2007), we believe that the AIC is preferable when the sample is relatively small. 
Nevertheless, we also report in Table A.3 in the Appendix (column 1) the estimation results of the main 
coefficients in our model when we allow only one single heterogeneity type. The results are very similar to 
those obtained from estimation with K=2. Note that Battu et al. (2008) also model two heterogeneity types. 
Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) specify three, Munch et al. (2006) no less than eight. 
16
 1 – exp(-0.50) = 0.39. 
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Table 2: Unemployment duration and housing model – estimation results 
 
Exit to employment Tenant Outright owner 
Explanatory variables 
         Tenant -0.24 **  (0.11)
      Outright owner  -0.50 *** (0.18) 
      Constant -3.06 *** (0.45) 0.16   (0.99) 0.14 
 
(1.23) 
Woman -0.10   (0.10) 0.24 
 
(0.19) -0.09  (0.22) 
Foreign nationality -0.01   (0.13) 0.53 ** (0.26) -0.36   (0.41) 
Age 16-24 years 0.11   (0.18) 0.30   (0.33) 0.11   (0.47) 
Age 25-34 years 0.33 *** (0.11) -0.06 
 
(0.22) 0.04   (0.34) 
Age ≥ 50 years -0.84 *** (0.15) -0.14  (0.28) 1.62 *** (0.31) 
Low educated -0.02   (0.12) 0.01   (0.22) -0.63 ** (0.28) 
High educated 0.34 *** (0.11) -0.80 *** (0.22) -0.55 ** (0.26) 
Cohabiting partner 0.33 ** (0.15) -0.71 *** (0.26) -0.35   (0.31) 
Working partner 0.15   (0.14) -0.74 *** (0.25) -0.52  (0.29) 
Having children younger than 18 -0.17   (0.11) -0.94 *** (0.20) -1.49 *** (0.27) 
Densely populated area -0.06   (0.10) 0.64 *** (0.19) 0.45  * (0.24) 
Brussels 2.55 ** (0.99) -3.01   (2.35) -0.10   (2.62) 
Wallonia 1.50 *** (0.56) -1.59   (1.10) -1.01   (1.26) 
Unemployment rate (province) -0.22   (2.06) 12.53 *** (4.56) -0.30   (6.20) 
Unemployment rate (region) -1.08 *** (0.37) 0.42   (0.74) 0.46   (0.87) 
% homeowners (province) 
   
0.13   (0.37) 0.17   (0.48) 
House price to rent ratio (province) 1.09 *** (0.15) -1.03 ***  (0.27) 
Duration dependence 
         t = [1] (ref.) 
         t = [2] 0.25 * (0.14) 
      t = [3] -0.11   (0.16) 
      t = [4,6] -0.41 *** (0.14) 
      t = [7,9] -0.88 *** (0.18) 
      t = [10,12] -0.40 ** (0.17) 
      t = [13,15] -0.94 *** (0.28) 
      t > 15 -1.68 *** (0.26) 
      Unobserved heterogeneity: estimates 
v2/u1,2/u2,2 0.80   (1.31) -20.00 
 
  8.81 
 
(8.19) 
q2 
   
-3.99 *** (0.76) 
   Unobserved heterogeneity: resulting probabilities and correlation 
p1 0.98 
p2 
Corr(v,u1) 
Corr(v,u2) 
Corr(u1,u2) 
0.02 
-1.00 
1.00 
-1.00 
Log-likelihood -2645.44 
Akaike Information Criterion 5420.89 
Parameters 65 
N 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some 
heterogeneity parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with 
respect to related housing tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this 
problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. (2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep 
it out of further estimation. 
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The outlined results underline the importance of distinguishing outright owners and 
mortgagees for an adequate analysis of the relationship between housing and labour market 
outcomes. In particular, they confirm the hypotheses that we derived from Rouwendal and 
Nijkamp (2010) in the introduction to this paper. Furthermore, they may help to understand 
the mixed findings in former contributions that did not distinguish the two types of owners. 
The very high fraction of mortgagees in Denmark (73%) may explain why Munch et al. (2006) 
find faster exit rates for owners than for tenants. Along the same line of thought, the more 
balanced composition of the group of owners in the UK, where only 56% are mortgagees, 
may explain why Battu et al. (2008) find no significant difference in the exit rates of owners 
and private tenants17. In Table 1 we reported data on the composition of the group of 
owners in Belgium. With 64.6% of them holding a mortgage, Belgium takes a position 
somewhat in the middle between the UK and Denmark. The empirical results that we 
present in Table A.4 in the Appendix should then come as no surprise. The table contains the 
outcome of a more restricted version of our model in which we do not distinguish between 
both categories of homeowners. Merging outright owners and mortgagees, we find no 
significantly different exit rate from unemployment compared to tenants anymore. This 
result is in line with Battu et al. (2008).  
Although our methodology does not allow interpreting the coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables structurally, their sign and level of statistical significance reveal some 
information about the control variables. The observed effects on unemployment duration on 
the left side of Table 2, are generally consistent with our expectations. Ceteris paribus, 
unemployment spells tend to last longer for individuals who are older than 50, not highly 
educated and not cohabiting. Although the latter is also found by Munch et al. (2006) and 
Battu et al. (2008), it might seem rather odd. A possible explanation could be the 
appearance of positive network effects that are associated with having a partner. Also, 
unemployment replacement rates are slightly lower when cohabiting18. Last, we see that 
regional dummies and the regional unemployment rate help to determine unemployment 
duration as well. 
                                                          
17
 The percentages that we mention have been derived from the EU-SILC database by Dol and Neuteboom 
(2009). 
18
 Data are available from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012). 
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The other columns of Table 2 show the results of the simultaneously estimated mixed 
multinomial logit model for housing tenure. Also for this component of our model, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables show the expected sign. We are particularly 
interested in the performance of the selected instruments. The percentage of homeowners 
in the province has only low explanatory power. A possible explanation might be the large 
scale of the province, summing away most variation. In earlier studies, the municipality was 
selected as the aggregate level allowing for more variation. Much higher predictive power is 
attained by the provincial relative price of buying a house versus renting in the year of 
contract/purchase. In line with our expectations, a high ratio causes a higher probability of 
renting and a lower probability of being an outright owner. 
4.2. Additional results and robustness checks 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our main finding, i.e. the 
longer unemployment duration for outright owners compared to tenants and mortgagees. 
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the estimated coefficients and corresponding standard 
errors for our main variables of interest. We summarize the results here: 
- We re-estimated our basic model first omitting one of the two instruments while 
maintaining the other. Then we re-estimated the model without including any 
instruments. The main results of the three additional estimations are shown in 
columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table A.3. The results without the provincial 
homeownership rate as instrument are close to the benchmark model. When not 
including the house price to rent ratio in the year of purchase or contract, the 
standard errors increase and so does the estimated coefficient for outright owners. 
The difference between homeowners with a mortgage and tenants is no longer 
significant. These results are close to those in column (4), the model without 
instruments. These findings underscore the importance of introducing the innovative 
relative price of owning versus renting as an instrument. 
- We re-estimated our model dropping all individuals older than 50 from our sample. As 
was clear from our description of the data in Section 2, there is a strong correlation 
between being older than 50 and being an outright owner. Although we control for 
age in our estimations, it could be advisable to check whether our results are not in 
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some way driven by this age group. As is well-known, and confirmed in Table 2, 
people older than 50 have typically longer unemployment spells. When we drop 
individuals older than 50, all our basic findings survive. We report the main results of 
this re-estimation in column (5) of Table A.3. 
- Finally, we introduced alternative age variables in column (6). More precisely, instead 
of four crude age categories, we directly included individuals’ age and its square as 
continuous explanatory variables. All our basic findings again survive. 
5. Conclusions 
Seminal work by A.J. Oswald (1996, 1997) suggests that homeownership impairs an 
individual’s labour market outcome. A key element is that high costs of buying and selling 
homes make homeowners less geographically mobile, which reduces the number of suitable 
vacancies within their reach in the case of job loss. Homeowners should therefore be 
expected to incur longer unemployment spells than tenants. Existing microeconometric 
research for the UK and Denmark, however, comes to different conclusions. Battu et al. 
(2008) find no significant difference in the speed of transition from unemployment into 
employment among homeowners versus private tenants in the UK. Munch et al. (2006) even 
observe a faster exit from unemployment into employment among owners than among 
tenants in a large panel of Danish individuals.  
This paper examines the impact of housing tenure choice on unemployment duration in 
Belgium using EU-SILC micro data for 2003-2008. Our research question and methodology 
are basically the same as those of the aforementioned studies. We contribute to the 
literature in distinguishing homeowners with mortgage payments and outright homeowners. 
We simultaneously estimate unemployment duration by a mixed proportional hazard model, 
and the probability of being an outright homeowner, a homeowner with mortgage payments 
or a tenant by a mixed multinomial logit model. To be able to correctly identify the causal 
influence of different types of housing tenure on unemployment duration, we use 
instrumental variables. Finding good instruments is always a delicate task. We propose a 
new (and strong) instrument, which is the relative price of buying versus renting a house at 
the moment in the past that people signed the contract underlying their current tenure. 
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Our results show that homeowners with a mortgage exit unemployment first. Outright 
owners stay unemployed the longest. Tenants take an intermediate position. From the point 
of view of the Oswald hypothesis these findings cannot be rationalized as the search and 
transaction costs associated with moving are similar for outright owners and mortgagees. 
Instead, our results support the theoretical framework developed by Rouwendal and 
Nijkamp (2010) and the role of housing costs. If the latter are high, liquidity constraints and 
the induced reduction of consumption generate strong incentives for the unemployed to 
find a job soon. Search intensity will be high, the unemployment spell short. If housing costs 
are low, by contrast, search behaviour will be less intense and the unemployment spell 
longer. The fact that ceteris paribus the monthly burden of housing costs is much higher for 
mortgagees than for outright owners, with tenants again in the middle (although 
undoubtedly closer to mortgagees) can rationalize our empirical findings.  
Our results also provide a possible explanation for the discrepancy between the former 
contributions to this literature. When the distinction between both groups of homeowners is 
not taken into account, the perceived effect of homeownership will basically be the result of 
the composition of the group of owners. A much higher share of mortgage holders within 
the group of homeowners in Denmark compared to the UK may explain the different 
findings of Munch et al. (2006) versus Battu et al. (2008).  
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
Table A.1: Definitions of variables 
Variable name Definition 
Tenant Dummy equals 1 if the household rents the house. 
Outright owner Dummy equals 1 if the household owns the house and no mortgage payments 
have to be made. 
Mortgagee Dummy equals 1 if the household owns the house and pays off a mortgage. 
Woman Dummy equals 1 for females, 0 for males. 
Foreign nationality Dummy equals 1 if the individual has a foreign nationality, 0 if not. 
Age 16-24 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 16-24 years old. 
Age 25-34 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 25-34 years old. 
Age 35-49 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is 35-49 years old. 
Age ≥ 50 years Dummy equals 1 if the individual is ≥ 50 years old. 
Low educated Dummy equals 1 if the individual did not finish secondary education. 
Middle educated Dummy equals 1 in case of a secondary or post-secondary non tertiary degree. 
High educated Dummy equals 1 in case of a tertiary degree. 
Cohabiting partner Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives together with a partner, 0 otherwise. 
Working partner Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives together with a working partner, 0 if not. 
Having children younger than 18 Dummy equals 1 if the person has children younger than 18, 0 otherwise. 
Densely populated area Dummy equals 1 if the individual lives in a municipality with a density superior to 
100 inhabitants per square kilometer, and either with a total population for the 
set of at least 50,000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated area. 
Brussels Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Brussels. 
Flanders Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Flanders. 
Wallonia Dummy equals 1 when living in the region Wallonia. 
Unemployment rate (province) Unemployment rate in the province (continuous number between 0 and 1). 
Unemployment rate (region) Unemployment rate in the region (continuous number between 0 and 1). 
% homeowners (province) Percentage of homeowners in the province of residence. 
House price to rent ratio in year 
of contract (province) 
Ratio of the provincial house price index (with Belgium1990=100) to the rent 
index (with Belgium1990=100), calculated in the year of purchase or contract. 
Note: As explained in the text, values are fixed at the start of the unemployment spell for all variables except for the regional 
unemployment rate. 
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Table A.3: Unemployment duration and housing model – Sensitivity Analysis 
Exit to 
employment 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Benchmark 
results 
(Table 2) 
Estimating 
the 
benchmark 
model with 
K=1 
Omitting 
provincial  
rate of 
homeowner-
ship as 
instrument 
Omitting 
historical 
house price 
to rent 
ratio as 
instrument 
Estimating 
without 
instruments 
Omitting 
individuals 
older than 
50 from the 
sample 
Including age 
and age² as 
continuous 
explanatory 
variables 
Tenant -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) -0.22 
 
(0.32) -0.23 
 
(0.32) -0.27 ** (0.11) -0.24 ** (0.11) 
Outright owner  -0.50 *** (0.18) -0.40 *** (0.13) -0.50 *** (0.18) -0.81 ** (0.41) -0.82 ** (0.41) -0.54 ** (0.23) -0.48 *** (0.18) 
Optimal K 2 - 2 3 3 2 2 
Log-likelihood -2645.44 -2654.28 -2645.56 -2701.89 -2703.20 -2033.56 -2643.29 
AIC 5420.89 5430.57 5417.11 5537.78 5536.36 4191.11 5410.57 
Parameters 65 61 63 67 65 62 62 
N 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 739 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some heterogeneity 
parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with respect to related housing 
tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. 
(2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep it out of further estimation. 
 
 
  
      
Table A.2: Model selection (benchmark model) 
 
# param. Log-likelihood AIC HQIC BIC 
1 type 61 -2654.283 5430.566 6152.887* 5730.726* 
2 types 65 -2645.444 5420.888* 6190.575 5740.732 
3 types 69 -2642.842 5423.684 6240.7371 5763.211 
4 types 73 -2639.318 5424.635 6289.053 5783.844 
5 types 77 -2638.714 5431.428 6343.211 5810.320 
      Note:   *: Preferred specification by this criterion. 
           AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. 
           HQIC: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
           BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. 
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Table A.4: Unemployment duration and housing model (restricted) – estimation results 
 
Exit to employment Tenant 
Explanatory variables 
      Tenant -0.05
 
(0.12) 
   
Constant -3.30 *** (0.44) -0.68 
 
(0.97) 
Woman -0.09 
 
(0.09) 0.26 
 
(0.18) 
Foreign nationality -0.01 
 
(0.13) 0.64 *** (0.25) 
Age 16-24 years 0.10 
 
(0.17) 0.34 
 
(0.30) 
Age 25-34 years 0.33 *** (0.10) -0.07 
 
(0.22) 
Age ≥ 50 years -0.99 *** (0.15) -0.88 *** (0.26) 
Low educated 0.01 
 
(0.12) 0.22 
 
(0.21) 
High educated 0.36 *** (0.10) -0.63 *** (0.21) 
Cohabiting partner 0.35 ** (0.14) -0.63 *** (0.24) 
Working partner 0.20  (0.13) -0.64 *** (0.24) 
Having children younger than 18 -0.11 
 
(0.10) -0.57 *** (0.20) 
Densely populated area -0.10 
 
(0.09) 0.54 *** (0.18) 
Brussels 2.64 *** (0.92) -3.02 
 
(2.16) 
Wallonia 1.56 *** (0.51) -1.33 
 
(1.02) 
Unemployment rate (province) -0.55  (2.03) 14.00 *** (4.89) 
Unemployment rate (region) -1.10 *** (0.34) 0.26  (0.70) 
% homeowners (province) 
   
0.12 
 
(0.35) 
House price to rent ratio (province)    1.44 *** (0.18) 
Duration dependence 
      t = [1] (ref.) 
      t = [2] 0.26 * (0.13) 
   t = [3] -0.10   (0.16) 
   t = [4,6] -0.41 *** (0.14) 
   t = [7,9] -0.87 *** (0.18) 
   t = [10,12] -0.39 ** (0.17) 
   t = [13,15] -0.95 *** (0.27) 
   t > 15 -1.69 *** (0.26) 
   Unobserved heterogeneity: estimates 
v2/u2 0.66   (0.54) -20.00 
 
  
q2 
   
-2.64 *** (0.61) 
Unobserved heterogeneity: probabilities and correlation 
p1 0.933 
p2 
Corr(v,u) 
0.067 
-1.00 
Log-likelihood -2348.70 
Akaike Information Criterion 4785.39 
Parameters 44 
N 1013 
***(**)((*)) indicates significance at the 1%(5%)((10%)) significance level. Standard errors in parentheses. Some 
heterogeneity parameters are estimated as a very large negative or positive number causing a 0 or 1 probability with 
respect to related housing tenure status for a subset of individuals. This is numerically problematic. When we face this 
problem, in the spirit of Gaure et al. (2007), we mark the offending parameter as ‘infinity’, stick it to -20 resp. 20, and keep 
it out of further estimation. 
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